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WHY JOHN MCCAIN WAS
A CITIZEN AT BIRTH
Stephen E. Sachs* †
Introduction
Senator John McCain was born a citizen in 1936. Professor Gabriel J.
Chin challenges this view in this Symposium, arguing that McCain’s birth in
the Panama Canal Zone (while his father was stationed there by the Navy)
fell into a loophole in the governing statute. The best historical evidence,
however, suggests that this loophole is an illusion and that McCain is a
“natural born Citizen” eligible to be president.
A person need not be born on U.S. soil to be a citizen at birth. Section
1993 of the Revised Statutes, the statute defining foreign-born citizenship at
the time of McCain’s birth, made citizens of certain children “born out of
the limits and jurisdiction of the United States.” The Canal Zone was “out of
the limits” of the United States—i.e., outside its borders and outside the
Fourteenth Amendment’s grant of citizenship to those born “in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.” But the United States had
exclusive control of the Canal Zone at the time, arguably placing it within
U.S. “jurisdiction” if not its limits. Thus, Chin claims, McCain was not
“born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States,” falling instead
into a “gap in the law.” When Congress changed the law in 1937, it would
have been too late for McCain to become a natural born citizen (assuming,
with Chin, that this means a citizen at birth).
Chin’s sophisticated analysis deserves to be taken seriously, but history
may point in another direction. The key statutory language, “the limits and
jurisdiction of the United States,” was first added in 1795. At the time, this
language apparently referred to a unitary concept—the United States proper,
the area within its borders—rather than two independent concepts of “limits” and “jurisdiction.” Like “metes and bounds” or “cease and desist,” the
phrase was a mere repetition—a doublet, or (in the words of Judge Posner)
one of the many “form[s] of redundancy in which lawyers delight.” To be
born “out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States,” it seems, was
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historically understood as synonymous—and not just coextensive—with
being born outside the United States proper.
The historical usage of the phrase and its continuous construction over
the first century after 1795 supports this reading. Early interpreters—
including scholars, congressmen, and state and federal courts—repeatedly
referred to the “limits and jurisdiction” of the United States to mean the
same thing as the nation’s “limits” (i.e., its borders). Indeed, the term “limits
and jurisdiction” was frequently used this way in contexts unrelated to citizenship. When separate requirements of limits and jurisdiction might
otherwise have conflicted, courts and commentators uniformly adhered to a
unitary interpretation of the statute. This interpretation was also consistent
with the recognized purposes of the citizenship statutes, avoiding the absurdities of a restrictive reading. Only recently have some questioned this
traditional interpretation; but because Congress did not alter the key language between 1795 and 1936, the provision’s original meaning was
preserved up to the date of McCain’s birth. Thus, the balance of the evidence favors a view that John McCain—and other children like him—were
citizens of the United States from birth.
I. The Text of the Statutes
A. Origins and Early Readings
Congress declared in 1790 that “the children of citizens of the United
States, that may be born beyond sea, or out of the limits of the United
States, shall be considered as natural born citizens.” Under this 1790 Act,
McCain would undoubtedly have become a citizen at birth. But in 1795, in
the course of amending the naturalization rules, Congress enacted a revised
text that referred instead to children “born out of the limits and jurisdiction
of the United States.”
Assuming that McCain’s status at birth rested only on statutory law (i.e.,
ignoring his potentially strong claim to citizenship at common law), whether
he is eligible to be president depends on the meaning of this 1795 language.
Congress retained the phrase “limits and jurisdiction” in the 1802 and 1855
versions of the statute, the latter of which was codified as Revised Statutes
section 1993. When that section was itself amended in 1934, the language
was left unaltered (the House report described it as “[e]xisting law in which
no change is proposed”), thus preserving the phrase from 1795 through
McCain’s birth in 1936.
On Chin’s account, the words of the 1795 Act applied only to children
born outside both the limits and the jurisdiction of the United States. He
reads “out of the . . . jurisdiction” as excluding anyone who might be “subject to [U.S.] jurisdiction” in the language of the Fourteenth Amendment,
i.e., anyone born owing allegiance to the United States and obliged to obey
U.S. law. A few special groups—such as foreign ambassadors’ families and
Native American tribes (prior to a 1924 statute)—were not subject to U.S.
jurisdiction even if they resided within its borders, while those born in out-
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lying possessions (like the Canal Zone) were subject to U.S. jurisdiction
even if outside its limits.
Did the words added to the 1795 Act really effect such a change in
meaning? Or did the Act merely paraphrase the earlier law it replaced?
While other aspects of the 1795 Act were controversial, there appears to
have been no debate over this specific change. The only potential statement
in the recorded debates suggests that the new language carried precisely the
same meaning as the old. When James Madison reported a draft version of
the Act concerning rules for naturalization, he also included “whatever was
necessary from the Old Law, so that the latter should be entirely superseded”—including, presumably, the old provision on foreign-born citizens.
Prior to the twentieth century, those who discussed the 1790 and 1795
laws together uniformly identified no difference in their content. For example, the scholar Horace Binney wrote in 1854 that this section “re-enacted
the clauses of the [1790 Act] in the same or precisely equivalent terms.” In
1860, a New York court in Ludlam v. Ludlam noted that “[b]y both these
statutes it was enacted that all children of citizens, born out of the limits of
the United States, should be considered citizens.”
Accordingly, early interpreters of the 1795 Act read that statute, like its
predecessor, as applying to all children born outside the United States. In
1798, a House bill listing categories of U.S. citizenship included the
“[c]hildren of citizens of the United States . . . born at any place out of the
limits of the United States.” During the nineteenth century, members of
Congress as well as several state courts used similar phrases to describe the
statute’s reach. For example, Senator Daniel Webster in 1848 described the
language of “limits and jurisdiction” as applying to those “born out of the
limits of the United States,” and the title of the 1855 Act described it as concerning children of U.S. citizens “Born out of the Limits Thereof.” In a 1907
amendment to the citizenship statute, Congress described its understanding
of the prevailing law in these terms: It demanded an oath of allegiance from
“all children born outside the limits of the United States who are citizens
thereof in accordance with the provisions of [section 1993] of the Revised
Statutes.”
Nineteenth-century interpreters of the citizenship statutes routinely employed phrases such as “out of the limits” or “out of the United States”
alone, even when directly referring to the phrase “out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States.” Apparently, no one objected to this practice.
As far as I can discover, not a single court, commentator, or congressman
attached any significance to the words “and jurisdiction” for the first century
after their enactment.
B. “Limits and Jurisdiction” in Other Contexts
Why did early Americans speak as if “limits” and “limits and jurisdiction” meant the same thing? Perhaps this was error, or a misleading form of
shorthand. But a better explanation may be that “limits and jurisdiction” had
the same meaning as “limits” alone—that the phrase was a particular type of
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redundancy known as a “doublet.” As Bryan Garner notes in his manual on
legal style, “[t]he doublet and triplet phrasing common in Middle English
still survives in legal writing.” Consider the “metes and bounds” of property,
or an order to “cease and desist”—or, in the Constitution, the “Aid and
Comfort” given to enemies, the “Revision and Control” of customs duties,
and the amendments that are valid to all “Intents and Purposes.” In each
case, the “and” of the pairing is merely one component of a larger phrase,
rather than a logical operator conjoining two distinct concepts. (The repetition, one might say, is merely “belts and suspenders.”)
The 1795 Act’s use of “limits and jurisdiction” may have illustrated
what the Supreme Court in Marshall v. Lonberger called the “lawyer’s wellknown penchant for redundancy.” For example, in 1789, Pennsylvania banished certain convicts “to some place or places without the bounds, limits
and jurisdiction of the United States.” This is an obvious triplet: No one
could read the words “bounds,” “limits,” and “jurisdiction” as each denoting
a distinct area, with convicts to be sent beyond the union of all three. Instead, the words were just component parts of a single colorful phrase.
The same can be said of “limits and jurisdiction” in other contexts. In
1793, Chief Justice John Jay used the phrase in Henfield’s Case to indicate
the territory in which certain acts could be punished if committed by aliens
“while in this country,” in light of America’s “sovereign[ty] within its own
dominions”—language indicating a geographic area, rather than a personal
status relevant to ambassadors or Native American tribes. Missouri statutes
in the mid-1820s used the phrases “beyond the limits of the United States”
and “beyond seas or without the limits and jurisdiction of the United States”
interchangeably in describing who could benefit from the tolling of statutes
of limitations. In 1838, members of Congress discussed war subsidies paid
by Great Britain to “Indian tribes within the territorial limits and jurisdiction
of the United States”; although these tribes were a paradigm case of not being “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” under the Fourteenth Amendment,
they were still located within America’s borders.
The phrase “limits and jurisdiction” need not always have been a redundancy; in some contexts, the two individual terms carried separate and
distinct meanings as they do today. But “[j]urisdiction,” the Supreme Court
observed in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, “is a word of
many, too many, meanings”; and at least one of these meanings was historically synonymous with “borders” or “limits.” For example, the Admissions
Clause of the Constitution requires that “no new State shall be formed or
erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State”; but this would not let
Congress form new states within federal forts and arsenals, from which another kind of state jurisdiction is excluded. An early version of the 1790 Act
likewise used “jurisdiction” to mean “borders,” referring to lands “within
the United States” that might occasionally forfeit to “the State wherein such
lands shall be, or”—if that condition could not be satisfied—to “the United
States, if such lands shall not be within the jurisdiction of any individual
State.” To be in a state and to be within the jurisdiction of that state here
meant the same thing.
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The territorial uses of “jurisdiction” can be contrasted with phrases such
as “under the jurisdiction” or “subject to the jurisdiction,” which typically
concerned state authority and protection rather than geographical area. The
1795 Act used “jurisdiction” in both senses: It allowed aliens residing
“within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States” to be naturalized if they had resided “two years, at least, within and under the
jurisdiction of the same,” and “one year, at least, within [the same] state or
territory.” Residing “under” U.S. jurisdiction was one thing; residing
“within” that jurisdiction was another, and was here treated as synonymous
with residing within the nation’s geographic limits. Likewise, members of
Congress in 1828 stated that Indians were “within the territorial jurisdiction” of particular states by virtue of being “within [their] limits”;
Chancellor Kent used the phrase similarly in his famous Commentaries.
This repeated usage—consistent with that of contemporary statutes and
official communications—counsels against reading “jurisdiction” as having
the same meaning in all contexts. To be born “out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States” in early America may have meant no more than to
be born outside its limits.
C. Application to Actual Cases
If the citizenship statutes used “limits and jurisdiction” to mean something other than “limits,” then presumably contemporary interpreters would
have recognized this difference. This is especially true when such a difference could have altered the outcome of concrete cases, with children
arguably meeting one requirement but not the other. In the only historical
cases I have identified, however, the children in question were uniformly
held to be citizens.
1. Native Americans
Before they were granted citizenship in 1924, Native Americans resided
in the United States but were not “subject to the jurisdiction thereof.” When
citizens and Native Americans bore children together, separate rules about
tribal membership—and not the foreign-born citizenship statutes—
determined whether those children were citizens, even if they had been born
in the United States. Indeed, in 1818, a South Carolina court interpreted the
statutes’ reference to “limits and jurisdiction” in solely geographic terms,
discussing a birth in Indian lands as if it might have been in a foreign country outside the limits of the United States. The plaintiff in Davis v. Hall
argued that “a person born within the limits of a territory occupied and
claimed by a nation of American Indians, is an alien.” The unanimous Court
of Constitutional Appeals did not ask whether the child would be subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States, instead noting that the case “has been
specifically provided for” by statute. The court found it irrelevant whether
“the place of birth were without the jurisdiction or limits of the United
States,” for citizenship would descend “whether that place be within the
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jurisdiction or limits of the United States or not.” This geographic reading of
the statute was hardly consistent with independent requirements of “limits”
and “jurisdiction,” and the reporter’s headnote summarized the holding in
similarly geographic terms: “Where a Father has been a citizen of the
United States, his Son is entitled to the privileges of citizenship, although
born without the limits of the United States.”
2. Birth Aboard Ships
Like foreign ambassadors, a foreign government’s ships carried with
them a bubble of extraterritorial jurisdiction. But private ships were also
subject to a form of jurisdiction abroad. In 1861, a federal circuit court concluded in United States v. Gordon that acts within the internal waters of a
foreign nation—a place normally outside the jurisdiction of American
courts—could still be subject to U.S. jurisdiction if those acts took place on
“an American vessel, owned by American citizens.” Nevertheless, the court
had no difficulty accepting that a child born aboard a vessel in such circumstances would be a citizen at birth. Justice Samuel Nelson instructed the jury
that “even if the defendant was born during one of those voyages . . . he
would still be regarded in law as an American citizen, although thus born
abroad.” The full court added that “there was no error in this part of the
charge,” noting that in context it “clearly referred to a possible birth of the
defendant on board of his father’s American vessel, while the latter was in a
foreign country.” While those born on such a vessel would, in the court’s
view, still be subject to U.S. jurisdiction in one meaning of the term, it read
the foreign-born citizenship statutes as concerning nothing more than geography.
3. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction by Treaty
Over the nineteenth century, the United States obtained extraterritorial
privileges in many foreign nations. In such countries, according to a 1906
State Department report, the “national sovereignty of law [was] transferred
bodily into a foreign soil and made applicable to [U.S. citizens] dwelling
there.” For example, an 1858 treaty with China provided that “[a]ll questions in regards to rights whether of property or person, arising between
citizens of the United States in China shall be subject to the jurisdiction and
regulated by the authorities of their own Government.” Yet an 1864 regulation specifically charged the American consul in China with recording “[t]he
birth and death of every American citizen within the limits of his jurisdiction,” which implies that children “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United
States could still obtain their citizenship by birth.
Several contemporaneous opinions by State Department officials made
this implication explicit. From 1790 on, the citizenship statutes had sought
to prevent the formation of permanent enclaves of U.S. citizens abroad by
requiring that the fathers of foreign-born citizens have previously “resided
in the United States.” In 1887, the Acting Secretary of State argued that this
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limitation “d[id] not apply to the descendants of citizens of the United
States” in an extraterritorial community in Turkey; instead, “[s]uch descendants [were] to be regarded, through their inherited extraterritorial rights
recognized by Turkey herself, as born and continuing in the jurisdiction of
the United States.” This relaxation of the father-residence rule was a stretch;
the communities in Turkey were never really “in” the United States. It was
not controversial, however, that parents in extraterritorial communities were
able to pass on their citizenship at all. Even though their children were recognized—in the Acting Secretary’s words—as “born and continuing in the
jurisdiction of the United States,” this was no barrier to citizenship when the
fathers had truly resided in the United States. In 1902, Secretary of State
John Hay asserted that “[i]f the father was a citizen of the United States
when the son was born [in Turkey], the son was himself born a citizen of the
United States,” even while noting in the same breath that that the son was
“born in a country in which the United States exercises extra territorial jurisdiction.” If the 1795 Act’s language had a plain meaning excluding
children like McCain from citizenship, this meaning was lost on the courts
and officials charged with enforcing it.
II. Text and Purpose
In weighing this historical evidence, we should not lose sight of how
odd a restrictive interpretation would be. Of all children born abroad, why
exclude those who already have a close relationship to our government and
laws?
Even stranger, Chin’s reading would deny citizenship to children of ambassadors and troops abroad regardless of where they were stationed. Like
ambassadors, soldiers stationed abroad are traditionally subject to the jurisdiction of their home country; and the children of these soldiers, like those
of ambassadors, were recognized at common law as having the same jurisdictional status as their parents. If the statute really imposed separate
requirements of “limits” and “jurisdiction,” then the Canal Zone’s status is
irrelevant; any child born to ambassadors or soldiers abroad would fail the
test. In fact, the 1795 Act’s language would have had little contemporary
effect except to deny citizenship to these children. It is hard to believe that
Congress would have taken this measure without debate or even contemporary notice.
There is no evidence that anyone in 1795 wanted to restrict citizenship
in this manner. The only relevant discussion in the debates suggests that the
Act was meant to replicate, rather than depart from, its predecessor. And
while the restrictive reading would have affected few places in early
America, this hardly provides a positive reason to enact it. Chin imagines
that such places would not have been “considered fit for women and children,” imputing to Congress the view that “births in foreign ports on allmale U.S. Navy ships[] would be sufficiently irregular and unusual” as to
exclude the children from citizenship. But the historical record contains no
evidence of such concerns. And here a page of history is worth a volume of

SACHS FI FTP2 M.DOC

56

9/29/2008 1:46 PM

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

[Vol. 107:49

speculation: When the courts indeed encountered a child born aboard a
U.S.-flagged ship, no such doubts were expressed.
By contrast, there was a great deal of contemporary recognition of another legislative purpose: to make the citizenship of these children
independent of their place of birth. The 1790 Act, like its British predecessors, took a general approach; but for certain named exceptions, anyone not
a citizen by place of birth could become one by parentage. Chin reads the
“limits and jurisdiction” language of the 1795 Act as more restrictive than
its predecessor. But the 1802 Act employed the same phrase in a manner
strongly suggesting a gapless reading of the statute as a whole, providing
that “the children of persons who now are, or have been citizens of the
United States, shall, though born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the
United States, be considered as citizens of the United States.” In other
words, the provision referred to the children of U.S. citizens born anywhere
in the world, declaring them to be citizens themselves—even if, not having
been born within the United States proper, they might not have been citizens
otherwise.
Early Americans consistently described the statutes’ purpose in this
fashion—as ensuring, as Massachusetts’ high court put it in Inhabitants of
Manchester v. Inhabitants of Boston, that children of U.S. citizens would
enjoy their parents’ status “whether born within the United States or not.”
When two readings of a text can each be supported linguistically, the one in
better accord with a statute’s structure and purpose was more likely the one
relied on by those who drafted the law. In the absence of any apparent
(much less coherent) motive for Congress to restrict citizenship in this way,
these considerations strongly favor a gapless reading of the text.
Conclusion
After a century of consistent interpretation, a new reading of “limits and
jurisdiction” emerged in the early 1900s. The spread of this new reading,
however, should hardly be surprising. If mistaken, it was the kind of mistake
that no one could have made before America acquired vast unincorporated
possessions, subject to U.S. control even as their inhabitants were famously
excluded from America’s limits (and the benefits appurtenant thereto). Read
alone and out of context, the words “limits” and “jurisdiction” began to pull
in different directions. In 1898, the Supreme Court in United States v. Wong
Kim Ark claimed to construe the words of the Fourteenth Amendment—
concerning those born “in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof”—as “the converse” of the limits-and-jurisdiction phrase “habitually
used in the naturalization acts.” In the twentieth century, some came to read
this dictum as supporting a restrictive reading, importing the Fourteenth
Amendment’s separate conditions into the statute’s more unified language.
But this view was hardly unanimous. Others read the Court’s use of
“converse” to mean “negation,” meaning that anyone not guaranteed citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment could potentially obtain it under the
statute. For example, the State Department understood the Court’s decision
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this way in 1929, when it declared that children like McCain—born to
American parents in the Canal Zone—were citizens at birth. In the Department’s view, it was “not proper to consider the word ‘jurisdiction’ as
disconnected with the word ‘limits’ ”; instead, the phrase conveyed “a single
idea,” which was “the antithesis” of the Fourteenth Amendment’s test for
citizenship and which applied to all those born “outside of the United States
proper,” including “those born in the unincorporated territories.”
The State Department had it right. To read the citizenship statutes as imposing separate conditions of “limits” and “jurisdiction,” and as excluding
children like McCain, would not only produce bizarre results: It would also
be something of an anachronism. The statutory language had been preserved
unaltered since 1795, and the Third Congress had no obligation to speak in
any other way than would allow it to be understood by its contemporaries.
“Limits and jurisdiction” was frequently employed as a doublet in early
America, and if it was not one in the 1795 Act, no one seems to have remarked on that fact for more than a hundred years.
Of course, no one in 1795 thought to mention all the absurd consequences the Act would not produce. Perhaps the early constructions of the
statutes were mistakes or overgeneralizations; perhaps Congress’s true purpose went unrecognized and early courts and officials repeatedly erred in
their application of the law. But we must weigh the evidence as we find it,
and the balance of that evidence suggests that John McCain was a citizen at
birth.

